Apart from the incompetent service of a Russian ship-of-war, w^hich is a necessary consequence of the circumstances just mentioned, the entire want of a merchant navy is most unfavourable for the fleet. A commercial marine is the corps de reserve for the war service ; its national guard or yeomanry. England, Denmark, North America, and almost all maritime nations, have had an important trading marine, which could not only supply them with experienced seamen, but also with ships-of-war, by furnishing them with guns and issuing letters of marque. The naval commerce of Russia is almost entirely passive. If all the Russian vessels in all the Russian harbours were reckoned together, they would certainly fall far short of a thousand. In war, therefore, Russia could only reckon on the ships built expressly for the pm-pose ; and while the army is surrounded even to superfluity with the very effective Cossacks and other light troops, the sea Cossacks, the privateers, are altogether wanting. From all these circumstances, it is clearly incorrect to oppose the mere numbers of the Russian ships of the line and frigates to those of other nations when thenrelative strength is in question. In this respect, Russia stands in the same relation to Denmark, France, and Spain, as these powers do to England, and England again to North America, which in a naval war would be formidable to its enemies by its immense merchant navy, and by no means from the number of its ships-of-war.
As on the other hand, the want of a commercial navy deprives Russia of its proper nursery for seamen, so on the other, from this very want the whole object of existence of a Russian fleet is different from that of others. It has no merchantmen to protect, nor distant colonies with which to keep up a communication. There are no convoys required ; the snow and icefields that she possesses in North America, to which an expedition is made every three years, excepted, Russia has no colonies to visit, no commerce to protect in distant watei-s, against unexpected enemies or pirates.
The English, French, Dutch, and Danish fleets have constantly, evea
To the natives of Alsace, Lorraine, &c. &c.
ill the midst of a general peace, warlike business on their hands in distant parts of the globe ; a blockade in America, an insult to their flag to avenge near Australia, pirates to chastise or slave-ships to take possession of. The Russian fleet has nothing but its yearly manoeu\Tes on the Baltic and the Black Sea ; hence the dexterity to be acquired by experience must be wanting. The fleets of other European powers have the whole ocean for their practice-field ; the Russians have only two inland seas, nor even those in full measure, on account of the peculiar situation of the Russian harbours. Their climate is such that in the Baltic ports, in the White Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk, the fleets are compelled to remain inactive the greater part of the year. For six or eight months their vessels lie useless in their harbours ; the time for practice in navigation is consequently very short, and the free disposal of their naval strength, in case of a war, much limited.
The relations of the southern ports of Astrakhan, Nikolayefl", Odessa, Kherson, and Sevastopol, in reference to chmate, are httle more favourable ; so that for the greater part of the year, a Russian fleet may be looked upon as little better than an unavailable force, or a dead capital.