I've saved Sebastopol!" The Russians were astonished at their own success; above all, they were surprised at the supineness and want of vigilance among the allies. They tell stories of their stealing in upon our sentries and carrying them off, and of their rushing at night into our trenches, and finding the men asleep in their blankets; they recount with great glee the capture of a sergeant and five men in daylight, all sound in slumber (poor wretches, ill-fed, illclad, and worked beyond the endurance of human nature), in one of the ravines towards Inkermann. Among many stories of the kind which I have heard, one is remarkable, ^^'hen the attack on Inkermann was projected, it was arranged that one strong column of men, having crossed the bridge of the Tchernaya, near the head of the harbour, should march along the road which winds up above the Quarries ravine, and which leads right upon the ground then occupied by Evans's Division, but this was conceived to be the most daring part of the enterprise, "as no doubt, strong pickets would be posted on that road, and guns commanding the bridge, or raking the road, would be placed behind the scarps, and these guns would have to be taken, and the pickets and their supports driven in." Judge of our astonishment when we found no scarps at all, and not a single gun on this point.
Our General cried, as he gained the level oi" the plateau without a shot being fired, ' We have them— Sebastopol is saved!' " The bridge over the Tchernaya was not repaired for the passage of men and guns till it was some time past five 'clock in the morning of the 5th, and the men did not begin to i-epair it till after dark on the preceding evening. But, after all, we may have been saved by the very imbecility of our leaders. When the conflict before Sebastopol assumed such gigantic proportions it became the war itself. The armies of Russia were absorbed into it, and perished in detail. Had we taken Sebastopol at the outset, we must have been pi-epared, with our small army, to meet those corps d'armee which lost tens of thousands in their hasty march to relieve the place, but who, in the event of its capture, would have closed slowly round US, and the same incapacity which prevented our reaping the fruits of our coup-de-main in attempting the Crimean expedition, might have led to more serious evils in a protracted campaign in the open field against a numerous and well-handled, if not a daring, enemy.
Success has indeed been obtained, but its cost has been great. What is to be said now if much of that cost can be shown to have been a gratuitous outlay of time and money? To me, next to the gravej'arc"';, now verdant oases in the dark plateau, the most melancho^; and significant object is our old parallel opened against the ^.alakholf, which the French took from us and adopted as the basis of their attack in the spring of 1855. The battle of the Alma had produced such an effect on the inhabitants that tliere seemed to be no chance of offering resistance to the allies, and the fall of the town was regarded as certain. The Russians, however, meditated a great revenge, and, knowing the weakness of our army, and that it could not hold the heights and storm the town at the same time, they intended, according to this officer, to take the very plateau on whi(;h we ai'e now encamped, and to fall on our troops while we were disorganized by our success, and get them between the fire of the Russian shipping, of the northern forts, and of the field artillery outside the place.
At first they could not understand the flank march to Balaklava, except as a manoeuvi'e to escape the fire of the north forts, and to get at the weak side of the city, and for three or four days they waited uncertain what to do, until the}' learned we were preparing for a siege. It was then— that is, about five days after we appeared before the place — that they commenced their works. Men, women, and children laboured at them with zeal, and for the first time a hope was entertained of saving Sebastopol, or of maintaining the defence till the corps d'armee destined for its relief could march down to raise the siege. The same officer further stated that on the 9th of September he was in command of the advanced posts at Mackenzie, and that his orders were " to fall back and retire with the guns on the appearance of the enemy in force." He declares that the Russians were astonislied at our inactivity, and that they expected a general oftensive movement as soon as we had obtained possession of the south side.