CHAPTER XXXIV. SEBASTOPOL ONCE 310EE. Ufore about Kinbiirn — How Odessa may be reduced — Winter at Kinburn — Captain Sherard Osborne's flotilla in the Sea of Azofl"— Arabat Kaffa, or Tlieodoi^ia — Tlie Peninsula of Kertch — Another expedition advocated— Alarm in Nicholaiuff — Return of the admirals — Return of the " Hi.chflyer" from Circassia — Russian plans and manceuvres — Differences of opinion amongst naval and military commanders — Good understanding between French and English generals remains inviolate — The English force — Its excellent condition — Aspirations — Locomotives — Sir \V. J. Codrington's military career — Probable retirement of Sir Richard Airey — His successor. Before Sebastopol, JSiovemher 3. When the fleet was off Odessa, the advice of the highest person in France on the project of bombarding the town was sought by the French Admiral, and it is believed that his reply implied a " radical opposition" to any such pi'oceeding, nor was our Admiral authorised by the home authorities to attack Odessa unless he was certain of success.
Sir Edmund Lyons and Admiral Bruat have acted all along in the most perfect accord, but there has been this diSiculty in their mutual relations, that Admiral Lyons is not under the orders of the British Commander-in-Chief of the army, while Admiral Bruat is directly vmder the control of Marshal Pelissier, and it is known that the latter is opposed to any operations which would require large detachments from the French army. It was proposed at one time to send in a flag of truce to Odessa with some such proposition as this to the Governor — " Are you the Governor of,a commercial town or of a military station? If you say Odessa is purely a commercial town, destroy your forts, abandon your efibrts to fortify it, deliver up your gun-boats, if any, and we promise to respect the place.
If you say Odessa is a military station, you must expect to see it treated as such by the allied fleets." However, in case of the Russians refusing to give up their guns, &c., and setting us at defiance, it would have been necessary for us to attack the town coute qui cotlte, and there were many reasons why at that particular time such a course would not have been desirable. It may be doubted — indeed, it is, I believe, doubted — by the English Admiral that we could destroy Odessa from the sea by such means as we at present possess. It is a town built of stone, consisting of wide streets, of places, and squares, oirering little combustible matter, and placed at such a distance behind the batteries as to be accessible only to mortar vessels and horizontal fire at a very long, and therefore at a very uncertain, range.
The houses are roofed with iron, and in many cases there is no woodwork in the flooring or ceiling of the diflerent stories, hut iron girders and tiles and slabs of stone are used instead of planks and rafters. Many of the houses are detached, and stand like so many palazzi in their own grounds. Under these circumstances a general fire would be almost out of the question, and the damage caused by a bombardment would not be very decisive or extensive. With all the efforts of friends and foes to destroy it, how much of Sebastopol still remains? The Russians, by the agency of powder, of piles of wood, of tar, of turpentine, and of all sorts of combustibles, tried to get it into a blaze, but they failed, notwithstanding a favourable breeze; and we rained shells on it for months, and never succeeded in creating any conliagration of importance.
Well, Sebastopol contained much more wood than Odessa does, and was much more accessible to our fii-e. The inference is, that we could not by any bombardment of the fleet set the town in a blaze, or inflict damage which would compensate the allies for the expenditure of all their shell. It is evident that at some period or another our fire would cease from exhaustion of means. Even a line-of-battle-ship's powder magazines and shot and shell rooms are not illimitable. It is equally clear that a line-of-battle steam-ship could not try to come in close enough to the forts to develope her fire, without running the gxeatest risk of being disabled before she could get into position. The moment would come eventually when our bomb-vessels and gun-boats and heavy steam frigates would be compelled to cease firing, and that probably before much injury was done to a large, distant, stone-built town like Odessa; and then, if the Russians could frre even one gun as we retreated, they would claim, and with some colouring — which would seem verj' bright and decided in some circles in England and in many cities and towns of despotic Germany and of free America — the credit of having beaten ort" the allied fleets!