At times it was difficult for even a single battalion to march from the army of the Belbek or jMackenzie's Farm into the city, or to effect the usual reliefs. If to these considerations be - added the notorious sentiments and opinions of persons high in authority, Avho advocated the ahandonr,ient of the siec/e, and tlie retreat of the army from the Crimea after the battle of lukerraann, it will be seen that our prospects would not have been much better had weather like that we now enjoy prevailed last winter. One of the best soldiers in the army — a veteran of great and vai'icd experience — was so convinced of the dangers and falsity of our position, that he strongly advised the Commander-in-Chief to withdraw om* ai'my, and renew the attempt on Sebastopol in another form this yeai\ The inconvenience to which the famous flank march had subjected the army became more apparent every day after the failui-e of the first bombardment.
The flank march was opposed, or was viewed with disfavour, by oflicers of great authority, and by one whose sagacity and skiU are seldom deceived in military operations, although he is not a soldier, and does not command on land. The descent on the Crimea itself was a bold stroke towards the captm-e of Sebastopol. The battle of the Alma left the approach to the city open to us whenever we liked. Prince MenschikoS"s flank march to Bakshiserai and Simpheropol, although somewhat ridiculed at the time, is now considered a judicious and daring movement, but it certainly uncovered the north of Sebastopol, the Tchernaya, and Balaklava: and, as it was determined by our generals to abandon the dashing character of the expedition, and to assume for our operations a strategical chai'acter, to which they had no previous pretensions, we were obliged to look out for harbom-s, and the inlets of Balaklava, Kamiesch, and Kasat(ih met the eye and fixed om* destiny.
Then came the period during which, without let or liindr;ince, or attempt at interference or prevention, the Eussians were allowed to recover from tlieii' surprise and alarm and flock back to Sebastopol, under the direction of a man of extraordinary genius. Then they began the rudiments of the vast works which baffled our eflbrts for eleven long months of trial, suffering, and bloodshed, heroically endured and overcome. Now it is perceived that if the advice of SuGeorge Cathcart had been followed, the city might have been ours by a vigorous assault on the day after we arrived on this plateau. The ships alone could never have defended the place, and the gi'eater portion of the feeble garrison, such as it was, consisted of the equ'qjciges, or crews, of those very ships.
The enemy when they retreated to the north side would have been as impotent as they are now, and Sebastopol, in all its beauty, and with all its vast stores and riclies, would have been in our possession. Tliat is tlie lij'pothesis as to the result of vigorous action from the south side. But had we approached the cit_y from the north side, there can be no doubt that the forts would speedily have fallen, the fire of the shipping could have affected our operations very slightly, and the only inconvenience would have been the want of a harbom*. The anchorage is good all along the coast up to Eupatoria, and, except on the great gale of the 14th of November, no damage would have occurred to our merchantmen or men-of-war riding off the coast.
The mouths of the Katcha, or even of the Belbek, when the fire of the battery which just reached the latter was reduced, could have been made available for landing such stores and materiel as we required. With the northern forts the whole city of Sebastopol and the remainder of the fleet would have been ours; our army could have reposed on its laurels for the winter in an impregnable position; a year would have been saved in the war; and the Crimea would have been cleared of the llussians early in the spring of this year. Such is the hj'pothesis respecting operations from the north side. Such are the discussions which arise in the army now that it rests from its labours and sees a vanquished enemy gathering strength in a position which to us appears impregnable or unassailable.