CHAPTER I. Changes caused by the death of Lord Raglan — Fresh appointments — Condition of tlie rival armies — False move ou the jiart of tlie English — The attack on the Malakholf left to the French — Jlistakes — Incapacity of General Simpson — Preparations for the assault — Omar Pasha's proposal— The autlior at Therapia — Sick and wounded officers — The attack on the Redan criticised — Prospect of another winter in the trenches — Cholera — Recapitulation — Position of the contending forces. During the interval that elapsed between the lamented death of Lord Raglan, on the 28th June, and the middle of the month of Jn\y, no very decided progress was made by the English in the siege approaches, and the Russians contented themselves with strenuous preparations to meet another assault.
But as sickness diminished, and reinforcements and fresh supplies of material were poured into the Crimea later in the month, the allies set to work with renewed energy, and not only gained ground before Sebastopol, but began to feel their way towards the left of the enemy's position on the Belbek. At the same time they extended their oj^erations in the direction of Mangoup-Kale, and Kutchuk Sevren,first by way of reconnaissance, and finally by the establishment of standing camps of sufficient strength to dely a sudden attack l)y any force short of an army. In these operations the French performed most of the active work. They were aided to some extent by the Sardinians encamped at Komara, and by the Turks, who completed the friendly investment of Balaklava from the Sardinian right to the cliff's over the sea near Cape Aiya.
General Simpson, on whom the command of the English army devolved, was a veteran who had seen a year's service in the Peninsula in 1812-13, and in the campaign of 1815, and who thirty years afterwards held the post of QuartermasterGeneral to Sir C. Napier, in his Indian war of 1845; and it was supposed, in spite of his own reprementations to the contrary, that he was physically and mentally able to take the command of an army which was rapidly assuming the tbrm and functions of a contingent in face of the reinforcements so lavishly given to our allies. Lord Raglan had, at all events, by the dignity of his personal character, secured a position for the troops he commanded, to which they were not numerically entitled; but no one can say by what sacrifices that position was maintained till the battle of Inlcerman forced us to abandon it.
The time is not yet come for the disclosure of all the truth, but it may even now be asked, how it was that on nth Februaiy, 1855, we abandoned our ground opposite the Malakhoft' to the rrencli, if we really knew it to be the key of the Russian position? A change was indeed necessary, and it was evident that the English army was much too weak to occupy the space from the Dockyard Creek ravine on the left, to the valley of the Tchernaya on the right. But why, instead of allowing the French (I use that word " allowing," inasmuch as we are given to understand that ^ir John Burgoyne objected to the change,) why, instead of allowing the P^-ench to take from us the favourable ground on our right attack, did we not move to our right, and leave the French to occupy the spot held by our left, which we maintained to the end of the siege?
It seems but natm-ul that as we had defended the right of the Allied Army at Inkerman, with so much loss, and so much courage, we should have continued to occupy a position we had rendered glorious for ever. A cession of it to the French appears to be a tacit reproach to our plan of defence. By concentrating our left on our right attack, we could have readily carried on the siege works, and have preserved to ourselves the attack against the MalakhotF, which was originally opened by us on the 17th October, 1854. It is said that the French objected to take Chapman's attack, on the plea that they could not serve ouiartillery. Sir John Burgoyne then oilered that our artillery-men should be left to work the English guns; but the objection, if ever it was made, was futile, inasmuch as at a subsequent period of the wiege the French demanded and received the loan of more than twenty-ibur 32-pounders, which they used with great vigour at the final bombardment.