AH this is mere conjecture. As far as I have had opportunity of obsei-ving, I think the French incline to the latter plan. On the other hand, the distance is now so greatly reduced— is, indeed, so very short — between the French trenches and the Bussian defences, that a vigorous assault ought to succeed, unless, indeed, the more desponding anticipations that I have heard indulged in, as to the impregnability of the internal defences of the Malakhoff, should be even more than realized. At the same time, we must not be misled as to the probable amount of resistance by the fact that, since the fii'st day of the bombardment, the Russian fire from the iMalakholf, and, indeed, from all parts of their line, has been weak, as if their giuis had been silenced by ours, and that the works appear to have suffered considerable damage.
Mute though the ilalakhoff may be, it would not be surprising if, were we to assault to-day, our storming parties should find that every gun could still speak loud enough. The dearly-bought experience of the 18th of June must not be thrown away. On the other hand, our fire has been both severe and well directed. That of the French has been partial, and much less strong; and this has excited a good deal of comment and conjecture: some saying that there has been a misunderstanding, and that the French did not know they were expected to back us with their batteries. It is improbable, however, that there has been any mistake. Persons there may be — perhaps themselves too hasty and impetuous — disposed to tax General Simpson with over-great deliberation; but he is generally admitted to be a safe man, not likely to fall into misunderstandings; and one who would be quite sure of what was to be done before attemptitig to do it.
He certainly keeps his own counsel extremely well, and nothing has transpu'ed of the plan which it is presumed he has formed for serious operations at a very early date. Our loss during the bombardment has not been heavy. It was incurred chiefly on Friday, since which day no officers have been hit, to the best of my knowledge, and not many men. For hours together, the Russian fire has been very slack, an occasional shot here and there. They seem to consider it a point of honour to go oil" in great stj'le on the first daj^; alter whicli they run their guns behind the parapets, cover them with sand-bags, and allow us to blaze away without malcing frequent reply. There are reports that their men fight very unwillingly, and that there is great difiiculty in getting them forward.
This did not appear to be the case with those who fought the other day at the Tchernaya, but they were well primed with brandy, and, moreover, comprised divisions that had just arrived. Many of the battalions who attacked that day, had not been into Sebastopol at all. So at least we learn from the prisoners. That those who have long been defending the place should be discouraged would not be surprising, but the chief evidence we have is furnished l)y a Polish officer, who came over a day or two ago. Some of the prisoners taken at the Tcliernaya are said to have inquired what had been the result of the attack on our trenches, and, on hearing that none had been made, to have expressed their surprise, as one had been intended simultaneously with that upon our riglit on the 16th inst.
It is believed or supposed, that the unwillingness of the troops prevented the intended co-operation •which was to have been in the shape of a sortie against our right and left attack. All these conjectures, suppositions, and beliefs, must be taken for what they may be worth, which is often little enough. It would not be at all surprising, certainly, if the Russians were discouraged, heartily wearied of their protracted defence, in which they gain no ground, nor have the least chance of gaining any, for our position is really impregnable, and so they must begin to consider it, after the severe repulse of their recent attack on what probably they considered one of its weakest points. To return, however, to our own loss in the three days* bombardment.
The infornnxtion I have obtained convinces me that it does not exceed 200, or, at most 250 men hors de combat beyond the usual average daily loss in the trenches. This is very little, especially if we bear in mind that the Russian fu-e on the first day was really extremely violent. As to other damage, one or two batteries of our left attack suffered a little, as I told you in my last; our right scarcely anything. As regards the enemy, we may reasonably hope, Avithout reckoning too confidently, that we have punished him pretty severely. Although earthwork's take a divil of hammering before they show its marks, both the Eedan and Malakhoff* present a very battered appearance. We have, of course, no means of ascertaining the Kussian loss of men.