The compliance of Sir John Burgoyne on this point is the more to be wondered at, inasmuch as it was he who discovered the great importance of the jiosition we so readily yielded, and it was he who announced that the Malakholf, of which he relinquished the attack to our allies, was the veritable key of the whole of the defences of Sebastopol. After the 18th June, 1855, it became quite evident that onr left attack was utterly useless for the purjwses of an assault, and accordingly one would have tliouglit that the whole energy of the chiefs of the British army and of the Engineers, would be directed to push on our saps in the direction of the only point of attack the British army had to deal ■with, but in eli'ect the Redan was not approached much more closely by our Engineers subsequently to the 18th than it had been previousl}', and most of our efforts were directed to the augmentation of the weight and vigour of our fire from batteries already established, or to the strengthening of the Quarries battery, which we took on 7th of June.
In fact we seemed determined to take the place by the fire of Artiller\' alone, and yet when the time came we combined with it an assault, which was of course an interference with, and an abandonment of that determination. Although our ofiicers had the ilamelon before their €yes, they overlooked the fact that the Russians could screen a very large body of men inside their casemates and bombproofs, and that their garrison would suffer very little from our tire so long as it failed to search out and destroy those retreats. When the garrison of these casemates was warned, by the cessation of our fire, of the coming assault, they swarmed out in masses more numerous than the assailants, who were besides broken, and almost breathless, owing to their run from the trenches, and repulsed them ere they reached the abattis.
Whenever the Russians felt our fire was overpowering them at any one particular point, they withdrev/ their guns behind tlie traverse or parapet, and trusted to the strength of their earthworks, so that it was difficult to say what was the exact effect of our cannonade upon their guns. Thus, on the 18th June, our soldiers were raked with grape and canister, from points where we had imagined the guns were dismounted and silenced, and it was evident that our artillery had not gained that mastery over the enemies' pieces which was requisite to ensure success. We subsequently endeavoured to secxire a better chance for our troops, at the next assault, by establishing batteries to crush the flanking fire of the angles of the Redan, and of the curtains in the direction of the salient; but our tackles broke in raising the guns, and these batteries were never armed.
The arrival of Sir Harry Jones to replace Sir John Burgoyne was regarded with hope, but no change in the plan of attack was originated by that officer, nor did the b2 C: OMINOUS CHANGES. French engineers at any time appealto appreciate the hiiportance of the ground between them and the IMalakholi", till the Eussians significantly demonstrated the value of the Mamelcn bjseizing upon and fortilying it in the spring of the year. Sir JIarry Jones, although younger than Sir John J3urgoyne, was not blest with the health of that veteran soldier, and for some time the works were carried on without the benefit of his personal supervision, although no one could do\ibt the ability and zeal of Colonel Gordon, E.E.. of Colonel Chapman, E.E., and of Lieut.
Cowell, A.D.C., or of the numerous statl of Engineer-officers engaged upon the works. If the ground in front of our trenches and saps towards the Eedan was difficult, that through which the French di'ove their approaches close to tbe Bastion du 3fat, and notably to the Bastion Ccntrale, was literally a mass of oolite and hard rock, and our engineers will yet have to explain in the " aide memoire" what were the causes which stayed the advance of our saps, and prevented their establishing a Place d' Amies for our assaulting columns. The death of Lord Eaglaii, which produced in the army a sentiment of profound regret, and which gave to the nation at home a sensible shock, dcpfived the British army of a leader whose personal character and dignity of manner exercised considerable infiuence on the councils of the allied generals, however he might have failed to maintain the proper position of that army after the 5tli November; but General Simpson, who was appointed to succeed him, although it had been understood when he came out as Chief of the Statf that he would notbecomeCommander-in-Chief in case of avacancy,was certainly not suited to resist any pressure which our allies might think fit to apply; and he was destitute of those acquirements and personal characteristics which in Lord Eaglan compensated for a certain apathj' and marble calmness which admirers extolled as virtues.