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The Battle of the Tchernaya

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Such a result would be less than what we have a right to expect should the Russians risk a general attack, and should no greater be attained the fault will be attributable to the dispositions taken. Such an attack, promptly and vigorously met, ought to end in our wresting from the foe some solid advantage, perhaps even in the capture of the Malakhoir itself. Had we that, we should quickly be masters of the Redan and the Little Redan; it might take a few days to vanquish the resistance offered by the inner line of defence, but the issue of the contest, as regards the south side of Sebastopol, would no longer be doubtful. If, as we have some grounds for believing, the Russian troops are already considerably demoralized, the loss of the ]\Ialakhoff might so discom-age them as to throw the south side almost immediately into our hands.

Its capture and the destruction of the ships wovild render a very large force — in itself a powerful and numerous army — now employed in the trenches disposable for operations elsewhere. A portion of these troops might then, by the aid of our fleet, be promptly conveyed to Eupatoria, where we already have 20,000 of the best Turks. Suppose Ave sent off 40,000 men— say, 30,000 English and 10,000 Sardinians— leaving the French to observe the north side of Sebastopol and keep the enemy in check down here; we should thus form an army of between 50,000 and 60,000 effective soldiers, which would give an excellent account of airy Russian army attempting to retreat northwards. This plan I know to be considered by officers of high rank and great military knowledge and experience as perfectly feasible.

We have abundance of transport, plenty of cavalry could be sent, and such a battle might be fought, such a victory obtained, as would eclipse the glories even of Alma and of Inkermann; for it is to be observed that even those persons here who take the most desponding view of the prospects of the siege are as confident as men can be of our army driving before it in the field even very superior forces of the Russians.