General Pclissier said the other day, " I lose a fine brigade every ten days." It is no compensation that the enemy loses three to our one. The Russians swarm like flies, and their Generals are only puzzled bow to use them, or they could have twice as many. So strong are the expectations of an attack that all officers are ordered to stay in their respective camps. Last night orders were sent round to each division that all the troops should be in readiness to turn out at once at a moment's notice. On the rear, the French, Sardinians, and Turks were under arms long before daybreak, and only turned in when assured by careful examination in broad daylight tliat the enemy were not approaching.
The Russians have concentrated considerable masses in and about Upu, Ozembasch, and Chuliou, and Prince Gortschakofl" in person lately visited the army destined to operate against the Turks, French, and Sardinians on the rear, and was prodigal of promises and encouragement. The intelligence received by tlic English, French, and Turkish Generals coincides on these points, and is believed to be entirely trustworthj'. Nothing but despair could iaduce the Russians to attempt such an enterprise. As to a sortie, although it may be made with lai'ge bodies of men, it has no better chance of success, for our reserves will be kept in reudiness to act at once, and the force in the trenches will be henceforth greatly augmented. It is rather strange that we have never constructed any batteries to sweep the Woronzotr road, on the flank of the No. 11 Battery in our left attack, as a strong column of Russians passing rapidly along in this direction might cause our batteries on the left attack to be endangered, and expose them to the risk of being turned, unless protected by a strong force of infantry.
It has been our practice, until very recently, to send only 1400 men into the trenches of the left attack, of which one-half was of the reserve, and, as the latter were allowed to go back to camp in the daj-, it frequently happened that only 700 men were lelt to guard the whole of our extensive works in Chapman's attack. In future our ibrce will be increased, and the reserves will be maintained in all their integrit}', so as to be readj' to give efficient support to the trench guard should the enemy make any serious demonstration against our lines. And here I may be permitted to otl'er one word on behalf of such officers and men as have not had an opportunity of sharing the honours conferred on those who have been so fortunate as to be engaged in general actions during this war.
I am certain that there is a very general feeling in the army that there should be some distinctive decoration for " service in the trenches." Men have been decorated for Alma, Inkermann, and Balaklava who were not in the least danger or even more under fire than if they had remained in their club card-room, but no man goes into the trenches who is not exposed to heavy fire and to continual danger. The AdjutantGeneral's returns will show that in a forinight we lose nearly as many officers and men as are put hors de combat in a regular battle, although it will be observed that the proportion of officers to men killed and wounded is far smaller than it is on occasions of drawn battle.
A man who has served thirty nights in the trenches will have undergone more fire than if he had been in the hottest fight of the campaign. Why not let him have a decoration, were it only a bit of iron with the words " Trenches before Sebastopol" engraved upon it? The arduous nature or" our trench service is best indicated by our returns, and by the liict that many yomig officers who come out from England are rendered unfit or unable to discharge tlieir duties after a few weeks' experience. Altliough there are manj^ complaints of the rawness of the recruits sent out to us, they are as nothing compared to the outcry against the crudity of the lads who are despatched as "officers" to the Crimea, and who perforce must he sent in resjionsible positions into the trenches.