On the 24th the armies marched on the Belbek River, and finding the Russians in position on its right bank, they took ground to the left, thus turning the Russian batteries, and the English occupied the village of Belbek for the night.
The Allies were now within four miles of Sebastopol, and in aU probability there was not a soul in either army, with the exception of the Commanders and those in their confidence, who did not anticipate that the Northern side of the fortress was to be the object of attack. The place originally chosen for the landing, the line of march subsequent to the battle of the Alma, and many other circumstances, would combine to suggest such a plan of operations as being the one most hkely to have been decided on by the two Generals, and indeed it is believed with reason that the course eventually adopted was in part the result of a careful reconnaissance of the fortifications on this side of the town. These were known to be in themselves stronger than those on the South, and were found on observation to have been still further strengthened since the landing of the Allies in the Crimea had appeared to indicate to the enemy the direction of the attack which they had to dread. Any attempt on this side therefore was certain to be attended with delay and loss, nor did the mouths either of the Katcha or the Belbek afford so sure an anchorage as might have justified their being taken as a base of operations in the event of a protracted siege. On the other hand, the fortifications to the South were of a less formidable character, and were supposed to be even slighter than the event proved them, while the Chersonesus was known to possess harbours, commencing with that of Balaklava, which would afford shelter to a number of vessels, greater even than that required in so extensive an enterprise. Some such considerations as these must have determined the march upon Balaklava, a movement whose boldness of conception was only equalled by the judiciousness of its execution, and the good fortune with which that execution was attended.
This great flank march, one of the happiest strategic inspirations on record, which at the time when it was carried out was the theme of loud and universal eulogy, has since fallen into some degree of disfavour, from the supposed disproportion of its results to the anticipations formed. Such is at best but an illogical mode of arriving at an opinion; but even by this standard it may be fairly defended, since it must, at least, remain a matter of doubt whether the difficulties, delays, and disasters which marked the progress of the siege on the South, would not have been equalled, perhaps outstripped, by those the Allies would have had to encounter on the North.
On the 25th, then, the English and French, leaving the Belbek, began to march in a south-easterly direction, which soon brought them into a wood so thick and entangled as to present serious obstacles to the orderly movement of troops, and in which part of them were actually compelled to direct their movements by the aid of the compass. On emerging from its intricacies Lord Raglan, who was riding considerably in advance with his staff, came suddenly upon a large body of Russian infantry, which proved to be the rear-guard of a strong detachment, also executing a "flank movement" on Bakschiserai.
Our artillery and cavalry soon came up, and, after a few rounds from the guns and a charge from the cavalry, the astonished Russians once more took to their heels, without having inflicted the slightest loss on their oj)ponents, and leaving behind them in their flight an enormous quantity of baggage of every description, and several waggons laden with powder. The victors in this easy skirmish continued their march, and halted for the night in the little hamlet of Traktir, on the Tchernaya, since celebrated as the scene of the complete discomfiture of the Russians on the 16th of August, in their obstinate and repeated efforts to carry the bridge