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Spring 1855, the Expedition to Kertch & the Assault of the 18th of June

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On the morning of the l7th the English and French batteries re-opened fire with upwards of 500 guns and mortars on the works of the Karabelnaia, into which for two consecutive hours they discharged almost uninterrupted broadsides, and this terrific hail continued with but slight intermission to an advanced hour in the evening. For the first three hours tLe Russian batteries replied with even more than their wonted energy; but from that time, overpowered with the crushing weight of metal thrown upon them, their fire gradually slackened in fury, and at last almost died out. Throughout the night the Allies threw shells and rockets into the town, the roadstead, and even into the north side: but this fierce bombardment did not prevent the Russians from repairing the damages done to their works by the cannonade of the preceding day; and during the night they again exhibited that surprising vitality of defence, which was one of the most remarkable characteristics of the siege. By the next morning all their works were successfully completed, and the dismantled guns almost entirely replaced; and so strong had the defences once more become, that the assault could scarcely have been attended with greater risk had it been ordered twenty-four hours earlier, when our batteries had not yet fired a shot.

This extreme rapidity of restoration suggested the not improbable idea, that the Russians, on finding how great was the superiority of the fire of the Allies, had withdrawn their guns from the embrasures in preference to fighting them at so great a disadvantage: and that, covered by the darkness, they simply ran them back into their old places, in readiness for the assault which experience had taught them was speedily to be expected. However this may have been, it had at first been prudently arranged by the two Commanders-in-Chief that the artillery fire should be resumed for two hours on the morning of the 18th, "for the purpose" (we quote Lord Raglan's words, to which subsequent events gave deep significance) " of destroying any works the enemy might have thrown up in the night, and of opening passages through the abattis of the Redan."

Unfortunately for the result. General Pelissier was so completely deceived by the Russian expedient "of economising their batteries and fire," that he fully believed that that fire was entirely subdued, and, late on the evening of the 17th, he intimated to Lord Raglan his determination that the troops under his command should commence the attack at three o'clock on the following morning. In this change of plan Lord Raglan most reluctantly concurred, and the disastrous event of the day only too sadly justified his scruples and vindicated his military sagacity.

It was intended that the French should first carry the Malakoff Tower, the Redan of Careening Bay, and the intrenchments covering the right of the Karabelnaia, and that as soon as they were established in the Malakofi^, but not sooner, as the Redan was commanded by its guns, the English should advance to storm that work. Three French divisions composed the attacking force on their part, supported by a division of the Imperial Guard, who were held in reserve behind the Victoria Redoubt. Mayran's division had the right attack, and was to carry the intrenchments v,-hich extend from the battery of the point to the Redan of Careening Bay. Brunet's division was to turn the Malakoff on the right, while D'Autemarre's manoeuvred against it on the left.

General Pelissier himself was to give the signal for the general advance, which was meant to be simultaneous on all these points, by means of star rockets sent up from the Victoria Redoubt.

It was here that the first of that series of mishaps which marked this fiital day, and caused the first serious check the Allies had received in the siege, took place. Most unhappily, and by what General Pelissier terms " an inconceivable fatality," shortly before 3 a.m., while the General was still more than a thousand yards from the place whence he was to give the

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signal, the brave and ill-fated General Mayran fancied he recognised it in a shell with a blazing fuse, sent up from the Mamelon. He at once ordered his division to advance, but no sooner were the heads of the columns perceived bj the Russians, than a shower of missiles was poured upon them, not only from the threatened works, but also from the steamers, which, coming up at full steam to the head of Careening Creek, manoeuvred there with fatal effect. General Mayran, who had already been twice hit, was knocked down by a grape-shot, and immediately carried off the field of battle, while his men, dispirited by the loss of their General, and finding it impossible to advance under the deadly fire to which they were exposed, were thrown into considerable confusion.

The rocket was now sent up from the Lancaster battery, and fresh troops coming up to the support of the compromised division, it rallied and contrived to hold its ground in the ravine of Careening Bay, but was unable to make any further demonstration in advance.