Blu42 Media

Spring 1855, the Expedition to Kertch & the Assault of the 18th of June

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was excellent, and all accounts agree in stating that, had the Russian fire been as heavy and sustained as it was steady and accurate, the losses on our side would have been incomparably more than they were. On this night an attempt was made to convey six 32-pounder guns, from the first parallel, into one of the advanced batteries prepared for their reception; but so heavy, tenacious, and impracticable had the ground become in consequence of the rain, that several hundred men were after repeated efforts unable to move one gun from the point at which it had foundered. The Russians, guided by the noise, opened fire on this party, and at the first shot knocked off the muzzle of another gun; and that and the others were then left in the second parallel till the following night, when the guns were at last got into tho battery, and by daylight placed in the embrasures. Four of them which opened on the 12th were silenced by a crushing fire directed on them by the Russians, but on the 13th and 14th the whole of them were again worked with success, purchased it is to bo regretted by very heavy casualties among the gunners.

" As time wore on, the firing on both sides slackened day after day, until that of the Allies, gradually diminishing, finally reached the same limits to which it was confined prior to the 9th of April. It was evident therefore that the assault must still be postponed; the Russian defences, though seriously injured, were still neither breached nor destroyed, and the relaxation of the vigour of the attack would afford the besiegers leisure and comparative impunity in repairing tlie damage they had sustained.

" What then, it may be asked, had been gained in return for the sacrifice of life, the enormous expenditure of ammunition, the impaired efficiency of the siege-train, which had been the necessary results of the second bombardment? The events which we shall now narrate, and which occurred during the continuance of the cannonade, afford at once the clearest and the most satisfactory solution of this important question. It will be necessary to remind the reader that the two most important Russian works fronting the French left attack were the Flag-staff Battery or Bastion du Mat, the most advanced work on the left of the ravine, which separated the French and English attacks at the head of the inner harbour, and the Central Bastion, which continued the line of fortifications further to the left. Both of these works were protected in front by a strong chain of ambuscades or rifle-pits, terminated at the extreme left by a cemetery, which afforded a strong natural cover to the Russian sharpshooters thrown out in advance of the Central Bastion. During the days between the 9th and 12th of April, the French batteries kept down so successfully the fire of the enemy, that at night they were enabled to push considerably their approaches in the direction of the Bastion du Mat: and on the night of the 1 3th- 14th General Pelissier organised an attack for the purpose of wresting from the Russians and securing to the French engineers the corresponding portion of ground in front of the Central Bastion. The force destined for this operation was divided into two parties — the one directed on the ambuscades of the right under the command of General Rivet, the other directed on those of the left, and commanded by General Breton.