It is now perceived that if the advice of Sir George Cathcart had been followed, the city might have been ours by a vigorous assault on the day after we arrived on the plateau. The ships alone could never have defended the place, and the greater portion of the feeble garrison, such as it was, consisted of the equipages, or crews, of those very ships. The enemy, when they retreated to the north side, would have been as impotent as they were when they Iiad crossed over in the autumn of 1855, and Sebastopol, in all its beauty, and with all its vast stores and riches, would have been in our possession. That is the hypothesis as to the result of vigorous action from the south side. But had we approached the city from the north side, there can be no doubt that the forts would speedily have fallen; the fire of the shipping could have affected our operations but very slightly, and the only inconvenience would have been the want of a harbour at which to land siege-trains and stores, in case any mishap prevented the army carrying the place. The
* I do not allude to the advice given by Sir de Lacy Evans, who was so strongly impressed with the falseness and insecurity of our position in a military sense, that he recommended Lord Raglan to retire from it, as much as to the opinions of those generals who maintained that we had no business in the Crimea at all.
+ Notwithstanding a reckless assertion in Major Calthorpe's letters, I have the best authority for reiterating the statement that Lord Lvons looked with disfavour on the flank march.
anchorage is good all along the coast up to Eupatoria, and, except on the great gale of the 14th of November, no damage would have occurred to our merchantmen or men of war riding off the coast. The mouths of the Katcha, or even of the Belbek, when the fire of the battery which just reached the latter was reduced, could have been made available for landing such stores and materiel as we required. With the northern forts, the whole city of Sebastopol and the remainder of the fleet would have been ours;* our army could have reposed on its laurels for the winter in an impregnable position; a year would have been saved in the war; and the Crimea would have been cleared of the Russians early in the spring of 1855.
Such is the hypothesis respecting operations from the north side; such were the discussions which arose in the army when it had rested from its labours and saw a vanquished enemy gathering strength in a position which appeared impregnable or unassailable. The Russian General must have been a man of extraordinary confidence if he thought that on the return of spring he could have extricated his army from the grasp of an enemy which clutched the whole of his coast, was established at two points in his rear, and had four distinct bases of operation, with sufficient troops to use them all, and to concentrate a prodigious force on any point he pleased. The Russian infantry, in spite of its stubborn endurance and passive courage, is not equal to either French, Sardinian, English, or Turkish troops. Every day showed us that it had no chance even against the latter when they were led and officered by Englishmen or brave and skilful European soldiers. Their cavalry, in equal numbers, will be ridden down like grass whenever they stand against English or French squadrons; and notwithstanding the excellence of their artillery, compared with other arms of their service, it cannot compete with ours as regards rapidity of motion or precision of fire. In reference to future operations I wrote at this time some remarks, which even now are not uninteresting. I said: — " Prince Gortschakoff will be a grand strategist opposed to very weak generals if he succeeds in saving his army and marching them scatheless from the Crimea. The health of our troops is excellent; the draughts which arrive are rather younger than is desirable, but they will obtain experience and instruction during the winter. They are admirably clothed, and fed as no army was ever fed before — fresh meat, bread, and vegetables are issued to all. Henceforth the men are to receive fresh meat only three times a week, and bread only three times a week, instead of every day. On the other days they will have pork or salt beef, and excellent biscuit. In respect of winter clothing, hutting, and feeding, our men are immeasurably better off than our Allies, and it is not unusual to see the latter eating in the English camp of the excess of our soldiers' cooking kettles. Little friendships have sprung up in
* The Russians, it will be said, were on the north side, and yet they could not drive us out of the south side. But the Russians had no fleet. Even as it was, we never were in strong military force on the south side, and our boats never ventured on the waters of the harbour.
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